Part IV - The reform agenda for recovered sovereignty

The economic model inspired by the treasury circuit

The sovereign economic model rests on three inseparable principles. Currency is a tool in the service of real production, not a constraint imposed by external creditors: it finances what the country is capable of producing, no more, no less. The State is a protective shareholder and not a manager: it guarantees that strategic decisions remain national without meddling in the day-to-day management of companies. Rents - fiscal, capitalistic, monopolistic - are suppressed in favor of real value creation: every mechanism of this model aims to circulate wealth where it is produced rather than to concentrate it where it is captured.
These three principles are not ideological options. They are the structural conditions of an economy that serves the nation rather than extracting from it.

Sovereign economic model and financing

Sovereign France has a lever that the preceding regime had abandoned: complete mastery of its monetary policy and its financing instruments. This lever is used with discernment, within the framework of a coherent economic circuit that produces real value before distributing currency.
La création monétaire n'est pas le premier levier de financement mais le dernier. Elle intervient après mobilisation des économies de fonctionnement (rationalisation administrative, suppression des agences redondantes, réformes territoriales), du plafonnement des rémunérations publiques, du plafonnement des pensions versées par le système public et des réformes fiscales produisant des recettes dès la première année. Sa hiérarchisation précise, sa séquence et son calibrage sont détaillés dans l'annexe économique dédiée.

The Caisse des Dépôts - operational arm of sovereign financing

The reformed Caisse des Dépôts is the operational arm of sovereign economic policy. It operates according to a dual circuit: popular savings via the Livret A transformed into long-term investments, and direct monetary financing from the Bank of France for strategic missions, approved by Bercy. Its institutional architecture and governance are detailed in the section on institutions.

Within the sovereign economic model, it fulfills two concrete functions. It grants subsidized loans to state-aided companies, to departments, and to owners who renovate vacant housing: repayable loans, not subsidies. It also manages the participations arising from state aid conditioned on the cession of shares, according to a model inspired by the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund below 15% of capital, with sovereign right of veto beyond. The detail of thresholds and mechanisms is developed in the section on state aid.

State aid and sovereign fund

State aid granted to companies is conditioned on the cession of shares amounting to 50% of the aid, valued at the book value of assets at the instant T. Book value is deliberately chosen: it often undervalues micro-enterprises and SMEs and thus constitutes an additional advantage for the small structures that the project wishes to favor.
An anti-manipulation clause protects this mechanism: any notable manipulation of the share price before the aid request entails the outright refusal of the aid. For unlisted companies, the valuation rests on the book value of assets without possibility of manipulation.
The French State exercises its economic sovereignty not by nationalizing but by being an active and protective shareholder. The model is structured around three levels according to the size of the participation.
Below 15% of capital, the model is that of the pure Norwegian sovereign wealth fund: collection of dividends and capital gains, no interference in operational management. The State collects a national return without meddling in the company's decisions.
Above 15%, the State sits on the supervisory board, non-executive and distinct from the operational board of directors. It does not intervene on commercial strategy, recruitment, or current investments. Its right of veto is strictly limited to the three decisions with sovereign impact: sale to a foreign shareholder, massive relocation, disposal of strategic assets.
Independently of the level of participation, a golden share is held by the State in all French companies. This special share with no economic value gives the same sovereign right of veto over these three decisions to any company, whether it has received aid or not. Economic sovereignty does not depend on the level of participation.
Finally, if a company attempts to dispose of strategic assets abroad despite the veto, the State may temporarily raise its stake to 100% to block the transaction. This defensive stake increase is approved by Bercy: the minister is personally and criminally responsible for it. Once the threat is averted, the future of the company is decided sovereignly.

The systemic retention effect

Each of the mechanisms described above - universal golden share, state aid conditioned on share cession, CDC fund oriented toward real French assets, obligation to invest in French assets for jointly-managed supplementary pension schemes (detailed in the pensions annex) - produces in isolation a limited effect. It is their convergence that produces a systemic retention effect on the French productive fabric.
A French company considering transferring its registered office abroad, majorly modifying the nationality of its executives, or accepting a non-sovereign foreign takeover, simultaneously encounters four obstacles: - the sovereign golden share directly blocks the cession to a dominant foreign shareholder and conditions it on state approval - the state aid received has created a public participation whose exit requires a buyback by the company - the sovereign CDC fund ceases to invest in its securities and may dispose of its existing positions - the jointly-managed supplementary pension schemes (AGIRC-ARRCO and equivalents) remove the company from their list of eligible assets and progressively cease to hold its securities over a 20-year trajectory
The combined effect is a structural capitalistic pressure and a loss of institutional anchoring: a company that breaks with the national economy that nurtured it incurs a higher cost of capital, a degraded shareholder base, and a negative signal sent to the market.
This system blocks no one. Freedom of enterprise remains full. It simply makes costly what should be: the departure of a company that has benefited from public investments, public contracts, commercial protection, and French patient capital. For the vast majority of companies, the rational equilibrium is French anchoring since the sovereign system simply renders this equilibrium naturally stable, without added administrative constraint.
C'est le modèle que pratiquent Singapour (via Temasek et GIC, investisseurs domestiques dominants) et dans une moindre mesure la Norvège (via le GPFG). Ces pays n'ont pas besoin d'interdire les délocalisations : leurs caisses souveraines font pencher la balance naturellement vers la domiciliation locale.

Patrimonial antitrust

France draws inspiration from American antitrust laws to intervene when a private patrimony creates real influence or economic power contrary to the national interest. This intervention does not concern passive patrimonial wealth: an owner of châteaux, forests, or agricultural land without a dominant position is not concerned.

Any editorial empire combining print press, radio, and digital is mandatorily dismantled: pluralism of information is a non-negotiable public good in a sovereign democracy. A single shareholder cannot simultaneously control multiple press titles, multiple radio stations, or multiple digital news media. Private television is excluded from this mechanism as long as the cooperative model of journalist-owned companies is in force, cooperative governance making it structurally impossible for a dominant shareholder to capture the outlet, which renders antitrust redundant on this segment. If this model were to be reformed or abandoned, television would automatically reintegrate the scope of media antitrust without any additional political decision being necessary.
Certain infrastructures are by nature sovereign assets: their ownership by a single shareholder, a fortiori a foreign one, creates a concrete and unacceptable national vulnerability. Concerned are transport infrastructures (maritime and river ports, airports, major railway stations, conceded motorways), energy infrastructures (electricity networks, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, storage terminals), digital infrastructures (submarine cables, data centers hosting sovereign data, telecommunications networks), and water infrastructures (distribution networks, treatment stations, dams). On these assets, the State buys back the dominant participation or imposes regulated and priced access guaranteeing that no private interest can condition the nation's access to its own vital infrastructures.
The situation of the DOM-TOM illustrates a phenomenon that antitrust must absorb: certain families simultaneously control import-export, large-scale retail, construction, and fuel supply on a territory with no real economic alternative. This is a private feudal rent exercised over captive populations, which largely explains the exorbitant cost of living in these territories and the recurring social movements that result from it.
The response is graduated and pragmatic: one does not dismantle without having prepared the alternative, on pain of creating an immediate economic void on island or landlocked territories.
In a first phase, price regulation applies immediately to essential goods: margin caps by sector, maximum prices defined by the prefect, mandatory monthly publication of prices and margins at each stage of the supply chain. Transparency alone is often a powerful lever. A 400% margin on a basic food product published monthly creates a social pressure that even captive monopolies struggle to ignore.
In a second phase, the entry of new actors is actively facilitated: public contracts open to external operators, subsidized loans from the Caisse des Dépôts for competitors wishing to establish themselves, administrative simplification for new entrants. Competition does what regulation alone cannot durably do.
The dismantling of the most concentrated structures remains a last resort option, activated if competition is insufficient to break the dominant position despite these measures, and only when economic alternatives are operational. National equality requires that French citizens not be economically vassalized by a handful of families solely because of their geographical location, but this requirement is realized without creating a supply disruption on territories that cannot afford this luxury.

Abolition of subsidies to intermediary bodies

Political parties, trade unions, militant and ideological associations, and non-public media lose all public funding, direct or indirect. This principle is coherent and universal: each intermediary body draws its legitimacy from its members and its public, not from the public windfall.
Political parties finance themselves through their members and supporters; the public financing of electoral campaigns, addressed in the administration reform agenda item, is not paid to them directly but managed by the HCEP. Trade unions negotiate with the State, they must therefore be completely independent from it. A trade union financed by the State cannot effectively defend workers against the employer who finances its existence. Zero public funding: no secondment of civil servants, no financing via professional training, no direct or disguised subsidies. Militant and ideological associations finance themselves through their members. Non-public media finance themselves through their readers, listeners, and subscribers; a media outlet that convinces no one to finance it does not deserve to be kept artificially alive by the taxpayer.
Associations that fulfill a genuine public service mission (food aid, emergency housing, disability support) may benefit from public funding under one strict and non-negotiable condition: total transparency on accounts, minimum ratio of 80% of funds toward the actual mission, directors' salaries capped at 3x the SMIC, mandatory annual publication of all salaries for the top ten positions. Public money creates an obligation of transparency and salary discipline; an association that wants to pay its directors like the private sector finances itself like the private sector.
Foreign financing toward any French structure (place of worship, association, media outlet, party) is totally prohibited. This is manifest interference in national affairs, sanctioned by the closure of the structure and criminal prosecution of those responsible.

Prosecution of foreign tax optimization

Multinationals that declare abroad profits realized in France are prosecuted before the sovereign national commercial jurisdiction. An automated system detects anomalies in the profit/turnover ratio by territory and generates alerts subsequently processed by human inspectors.
Convictions entail the increased repayment of evaded amounts, the repayment of legal costs, and, in the event of repeat offense, the seizure of French assets. The extraterritoriality of American law over French companies is refused on principle: France applies the same treatment on its territory.

Governing in urgency: hierarchy and method

Toute phase de refondation politique commence par une réalité incontournable : l’urgence. Gouverner dans un moment de bascule historique ne consiste pas à dérouler un programme exhaustif ou à promettre une transformation totale immédiate. Gouverner, dans ces circonstances, c’est d’abord choisir, hiérarchiser et sécuriser l’essentiel. La légitimité de l’action politique ne se mesure plus à l’abondance des réformes annoncées, mais à la capacité à préserver la continuité de l’État et à restaurer, sans délai, les leviers vitaux de la souveraineté.
To structure action, three levels of urgency must be distinguished: vital urgency, strategic urgency, and structural urgency. This prioritization allows the avoidance of dispersion, administrative paralysis, and the illusion of an immediate total change.

Vital urgency: immediately restoring effective sovereignty

Vital urgency concerns everything that conditions the very existence of the State and the immediate security of the nation. It takes precedence over any other ideological, institutional, or procedural consideration.
It begins with the maintenance of order and the continuity of essential public services. The State must continue to function, to pay, to protect, and to decide, without interruption or hesitation. In a situation of advanced loss of sovereignty, vital urgency also includes the immediate recovery of all fundamental decision-making levers.
The first priority is effective control of the territory. On a transitional basis, the military is mobilized at land, maritime, and air borders to guarantee national integrity, secure flows, and prevent any destabilization during the transition. In parallel, national customs are reestablished, with reconstitution of personnel and progressive transfer of military missions to the civil administration.
A second vital priority is the immediate exit from the European Union. Remaining inside an EU conscious of its own survival would be dangerous: the institution could use all manner of pressures to keep France under control. Sovereignty is not negotiated before being exercised; subsequent negotiations will only take place after the complete restoration of our decision-making capacity.
This exit includes the immediate recovery of monetary and financial sovereignty, the Bank of France regaining full control of monetary issuance and national monetary policy. Military and strategic sovereignty is also reaffirmed, notably through the exit from NATO, with a six-month period to complete ongoing operations and secure the autonomous reorganization of command chains.