Part III - Institutions
4 - Refounded National Assembly
Representative democracy has a problem that everyone sees and no one resolves: representatives end up representing their parties, their networks, their careers, rather than those who elected them. This is not a question of individual morality. It is a question of structure. A system where political survival depends on the partisan apparatus mechanically produces elected officials who are subservient to the partisan apparatus. Changing the men does not change the result, the architecture must be changed.
The refounded National Assembly retains its essential function - overseeing the executive, elaborating the law, triggering referendum procedures - but its mode of composition breaks with the logic of partisan machines.
Composition
Sixty percent of deputies are elected in local constituencies by single-round majority vote. Direct territorial anchoring, immediate accountability to the citizens of the constituency: these elected officials have a name, an address, a community before which they answer personally. Forty percent are drawn by lot from volunteers, trained and compensated to fully exercise their mandate. These are not walk-ons: they participate in overseeing the executive, in legislative work, in committees, with the same rights as elected constituency members. Their presence guarantees that the real people - not their professionalized representation - are physically at the heart of the institutions.
This architecture is not a theoretical fantasy. It structurally neutralizes the logic of parties as power machines without suppressing political representation. Territorial elected officials anchor the Assembly in the reality of the territories. Citizens drawn by lot prevent confiscation by the apparatuses.
The holding of multiple offices is strictly prohibited. The duration of mandates is limited. These two rules are not details, they are the material conditions that prevent political professionalization and the formation of power rents.
Oversight of the executive
The Assembly exercises continuous oversight of government action: committees, public hearings, broadcast debates, prospective and retrospective reports from the HCEP. This oversight does not aim to paralyze the executive, it aims to guarantee that the executive remains what it must be: an instrument in the service of the national interest, transparent and accountable.
The Assembly is not omnipotent. It does not govern in place of the government. It does not claim to incarnate sovereignty alone. It is what a chamber of representation must be: a place of oversight, deliberation, and political expression, inserted into a system where sovereignty is incarnated elsewhere and exercised as a last resort by the people.