Part VI - Transition
3 - Institutional framework of the transition
The transitional phase requires a tight, legible and action-oriented institutional framework. It cannot rest on the ordinary mechanisms of a regime whose blockages constitute precisely one of the causes of the refoundation. Governing in this moment implies assuming a temporary centralization of decisions, strictly framed by a clear mandate, explicit political control and direct recourse to the people.
The pivot of this framework is the Planning Commission. Placed at the heart of the state apparatus, it ensures coherence between political decisions, administrative capacities and sovereignty imperatives. Its mission is not to substitute itself for the government, but to order public action around ranked objectives, to avoid the dispersal of means and to guarantee that each decision inscribes itself within an overall national strategy. Without unified direction, the transition dissolves into resistances, inertias and conflicts of competence: temporary centralization is a condition of existence of effectiveness, not a drift.
This exceptional organization is not unlimited. Its duration is bounded, its objectives are explicitly defined, its powers are subject to continuous political control. Parliament retains a role of monitoring and evaluation: an instance of control of the conformity of action to the sovereign objectives fixed by the popular mandate. The National Assembly and the Senate remain in function throughout the transition. When their deliberations slow down or block decisions falling within the restoration of sovereignty, the referendum allows these decisions to be submitted directly to the people: the legitimate and ultimate arbiter of everything that fundamentally engages the nation.
This direct recourse to the people is not a circumvention: it is the logical consequence of the principle established from Part I, sovereignty belongs to the people, not to the institutions that are supposed to serve it. When these institutions obstruct the popular will, it is the people who decide.
The Constitutional Council is dissolved from the first hours of the transition. The verdict is self-evident: decades of political and institutional endogamy have transformed this body into an anti-democratic lock, capable of obstructing voted laws and conditioning the holding of referendums to its own appreciation. An unelected body that places itself above popular sovereignty is not a guarantor of the rule of law: it is its negation. Suppressing this lock is restoring the founding principle; only the people are sovereign.
In the face of resistances, inertias and attempts at paralysis, the referendum becomes the central tool of the transition. It allows fundamental choices to be decided, the legitimacy of the action undertaken to be permanently renewed, and guarantees that the exception transforms itself into neither a lasting confiscation of power nor an authoritarian drift. The direct link between the transitional power and the nation is the only real protection against these two symmetric risks.
The transition thus possesses an institutional architecture that is both firm and framed: powerful enough to act, controlled enough to remain legitimate. It does not aim to last, but to open the way to a stabilized political order.